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FINDINGS 
Final Report of the California 
Senate Task Force on Family Equity 
I. 
by Joanne Schulman * 
Sara McCarthy 
Mimi Modisette 
JUDICIARY 
The public's perception and faith in our judicial system is, to a large 
extent, a result of the manner in which family law matters are handled 
by that system. More citizens are directly involved in family law 
proceedings than in any other type of court case. It is estimated that one 
of every two marriages ends in divorce:1 
In 1985, for example, there were 42,502 marriage licenses 
issued by the County of Los Angeles and 42,050 divorce actions 
filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court.2 
* Joanne Schulman, J.D., is a practicing family law attorney. Ms. Schulman served as 
staff attorney for the Senate Task Force and authored this Report. She thanks Anne 
Thorkelson, J.D., for her assistance and support. 
Sara L. McCarthy, M.A., is a Senior Consultant with the California State Senate Office 
of Research, specializing in child support, social services, and housing. Ms. McCarthy 
edited this report. 
Mimi Modisette, B.A., is a Senior Consultant to State Senator Gary Hart, specializing 
in family law, consumer affairs, and human services issues. Ms. Modisette edited this 
report. 
This report reflects the recommendations of the majority of the Task Force members. 
The Task Force wishes to express thanks to the Senate Office of Research, and also staff 
support provided by Donne Brownsey and Patricia Wynne. 
**{Eds. Note: Some sources were unavailable to the Women's Law Journal for cite 
verification. Where legislative action has been taken on the Legislative Proposals within 
this Report, the Proposal is so noted.} 
1. R. SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT 
AMERICA 17 (1986). 
2. Garfield, When Marriages Fail, CALIFORNIA LAWYER 18, published by the State Bar of 
Cal., Vol. 7, No.1 (Jan. 1987). 
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These cases have a profound and lasting impact on the lives of the 
women, men, and children involved. As one family law attorney 
pointed out, " ... couples have invested time and money in each other, 
their children and their property." Also, that "[t]o dismantle their 
marriage they must dismel1100f ~. What theyJose is 1l.Wft)' of 
life, not merely an accustomed lifestyle."3 The legal system's treatment 
of family law matters also affects the future of our society because of the 
large numbers of children involved in these cases. Children's economic 
and emotional stability during their growing years, their post-high 
school education and training, their impressions of, and belief in, the 
legal system are all affected by family law. Insensitivity or inequity in 
the handling of family law cases not only has a profound and lasting 
impact on the lives of the women, men, and children involved, but also 
affects the taxpayers who pay the price when delays in child support and 
spousal support enforcement result in the divorcing family being forced 
to rely on public assistance. 
Judicial Training 
Some attorneys assert that judges assigned to family law cases are 
not always knowledgeable or interested in family law: "[A]ttorneys 
complain of having to educate judges in the course of presenting their 
cases, and of facing judges who do not want to both read briefs or hear 
case law precedents." It is, as one attorney put it, "like playing Russian 
roulette with my client's future because we can be assigned to a judge 
who doesn't have a clue about family law, hasn't heard a case in 3 
years, and has never dealt with a complicated pension case in his life. ,>4 
Litigants, both male and female, have complained of judicial 
insensitivity and bias regarding the legal, economic, and emotional 
issues in their cases. Judicial gender bias is now a recognized problem 
nationally including California.s In 1986, the Judicial Council 
established a special committee on gender bias in the courts.6 Gender 
bias is of particular significance in family law cases, as a judge's 
3.Id. 
4. California family law attorney, as quoted in WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 
398 (1986). 
5. ARENDELL, MOTIIERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, EcONOMIC AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS 150-60 
(1986). 
6. "Chief Justice Bird Appoints Special Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts," News 
Release from the Administrative Office of the Courts (July 15, 1986). See also "Judicial 
Council Adopts Eight Recommendations Made By Committee on Gender Bias in the Court 
System," News Release from the Administrative Office of the Courts (Dec. 10, 1986). 
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insensitivity to the economic effects of their family law decisions can 
have a dramatic effect on a family's economic future? 
The high volume, complexity, and impact on people's lives of 
family law cases require an educated, fair, and efficient family law 
judiciary. Continuing judicial ~ioo on family law, while oot a 
panacea, is necessary to eliminate gender bias and sensitize judges to the 
economic consequences of their decisions. Judicial education is 
supported by at least some members of the judiciary. For example, one 
judge wrote the Task Force: 
... statutes should require that the [Center for Judicial 
Education and Research] CJER present a one-week educational 
program . . . at the beginning of each year for those judges 
commencing the assignment. .. The program should be modeled 
along the lines of the present continuing judicial studies 
program. Although I recognize this is a costly proposal. . .I 
think the benefits they (judges) could receive from such 
education and the quality way they could thereafter handle their 
assignment more than merits this proposal. 8 
And, as Professor Weitzman pointed out in The Divorce Revolution, 
such education is effective: 
When it became clear that awards that seemed fair in the 
abstract--awards that would "allow" a man to keep "enough" of 
his income and yet effect an "equal" division of family income 
and assets--actually served in these concrete cases to severely 
disadvantage women and children, the judges were more 
receptive to the notion that they should reconsider the 
consequences of their decisions and begin to think about what 
awards-setting standards might lead to more equitable results.9 
Of course, gender bias can be detrimental to men as well as to 
women; the important point is that education can assist judges in making 
more equitable decisions. 
7. WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 395-400. See also Report of the New York Task Force 
on Women in the Courts, Office of Court Administration 94,121-22 (1986). 
8. Letter from Justice Donald King to Judge Judith McConnell, Chair of the Senate Task 
Force on Family Equity (Sept. 26, 1986). 
9. WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 396. 
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Judicial Resources and Working Conditions 
In addition to education and training, judges and other court 
personnel who decide family law matters must also have adequate 
resources and staff to handle the vast number of cases and complex legal 
issues involved in these cases. Family law filings account for the single 
largest category of civil court filings in California courts. Statistics 
compiled by the California Judicial Council show that in 1984, family 
law filings comprised approximately 30 percent of the total civil filings 
statewide (164,252 family law filings; 65,711 probate and guardianship 
filings; 97,068 personal injury and property damage filings, and 
112,349 "other" civil complaints).l0 In large counties, the proportion of 
family law filings is even higher, estimated as high as 40 to 50 percent 
of all civil filings.ll However, family law cases are assigned less than 
one-fifteenth of the judiciary's time-perhaps only one-tenth - and, 
thus, do not receive their share of judicial resources. 12 
In addition to heavy caseloads, family law judges are faced with 
cases that involve increasingly complex and diverse issues. Child 
support, spousal support, and child custody present the possibility of 
protracted use of court time and resources as such cases can be kept in 
court intermittently for more than a decade. 
Judges and court personnel have complained of lack of adequate 
resources to handle the high volume and complexity of family law 
cases. As one judge pointed out in correspondence to the Task Force, 
... there must be adequate judicial resources allocated to the 
assignment so that judges handling family law cases, which are 
already emotionally and physically difficult, are not required to 
virtually kill themselves while performing the assignment. 13 
Serious consideration should be given to increasing the number of 
judges assigned to hear family law matters. At a minimum, judicial 
resources should be commensurate with the high percentage of family 
law cases. This would reduce the caseload of those judges currently 
hearing family law matters. 
10. Reported in Juris 13 (Nov./Dec. 1986). 
11. Id. at 13. See also letter from Justice Donald King to Honorable Judith McConnell 
(Sept. 26, 1986); Also see WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 398. 
12. WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 398. See also Justice Donald King, letter to Senate Task 
Force on Family Equity (Oct. 24, 1986). 
13. Letter from Justice Donald King (Oct. 24, 1986). 
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Adequate support staff also must be provided to family law judges. 
Family courts need, and should be entitled to, the same level of support 
services currently provided to probate and juvenile courts, including 
investigators, counselors, accountants, and appraisers. Also, a state-
administered court personnel system, with uniform statewide standards, 
might help reduce delays, inefficiencies and errors currently experienced 
in the processing and handling of family law matters. 
DATA 
In order to monitor the effects of divorce laws on the men, women 
and children in California, adequate statistical monitoring should be 
implemented. California citizens cannot wait for privately funded 
studies before addressing the needs of divorcing families and any legal 
system deficiencies in meeting those needs. Statistics which regularly 
should be gathered and published include: 
• The average amount of child support orders and rates of 
compliance with those orders. 
• The average amount and duration of spousal support awards. 
• The number of "delay of sale of family home" awards and their 
average duration. 
• The type of custody orders made. 
• Data on conciliation courts' mediation programs and services. 
RECOMMENDATION #1 
A more comprehensive training program in family law should be 
offered by the Judicial Council. In addition, other avenues should be 
explored to increase the attractiveness of and longevity in family law 
judicial assignments. Finally, methods of collecting and maintaining 
current data infamily law cases should be explored. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
The following implementation strategies were proposed: 
1. Judicial Education and Training. (Legislative Proposal #1) 
Legislation is proposed requiring the Judicial Council to establish a 
judicial education and training program on family law for all judges, 
including commissioners, referees, arbitrators, and mediators who 
regularly hear and decide family law matters. This training should 
include instruction on the effects of gender bias in family law 
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proceedings, and on the economic consequences of divorce for both 
women and men. This training should include a session on family law 
in any orientation for newly-appointed or elected judges, and a one-
week, annual family law training session. To facilitate training, the 
feasibility of CQIIlmencing family law assignments on January 1 of the 
year in which the assignment changes should be determined. 
2. Improved Working Conditionsfor Family Law Judges. 
The Judicial Council should conduct a study on how to improve the 
working conditions for family law judges. Perhaps more judges need to 
be assigned to hear family law matters so that the amount of judicial time 
assigned to family law cases is commensurate with the high percentage 
of family law cases. As an alternative, family court judges' salaries 
could be adjusted to reflect their higher caseload. Judges entering a full-
time assignment as a family law judge should do so for a minimum 
period of time, perhaps two years. This would help insure an 
experienced judiciary. Moreover, family law judges could be provided 
paid "release" time for continued education and training, and family 
court judges' salaries should be adjusted to reflect their higher caseload. 
3. Additional Resources for Family Courts. 
The attractiveness of family court assignments could be improved by 
providing more staff and resources for family law courts. The level of 
support staff for family law judges should be similar to that available to 
probate and juvenile court judges, and should include the services of 
investigators, counselors, accountants, appraisers, and additional 
personnel to assist in the implementation and enforcement of family law 
orders. 
4. State-Administered Court Personnel System with Uniform 
Standards. 
The Judicial Council should consider the adoption of a state-
administered court personnel system, with statewide uniform standards 
of court administration, in order to reduce delays, inefficiencies and 
errors in the processing and handling of family law matters. 
5. Collection of Family Law Statistics. 
The Judicial Council should expand its Statscan project to include 
the gathering and compilation of statistical data on family law cases. 
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II 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
FINDINGS 
Perhaps the major finding of Professor Weitzman's The Divorce 
Revolution is that the most valuable asset acquired during most 
marriages is the husband's (and occasionally the wife's) career and 
enhanced earning capacity. 1 Yet these assets are not recognized as 
property and are therefore not divided upon divorce. Instead, the 
husband is often allowed to leave the marriage with these assets in their 
entirety.2 This finding, in part, explains the disparate economic impact 
of divorce on men and women. 
Professor Weitzman found that the average divorcing couple in 
California had relatively little in community assets.3 In fact the average 
divorcing couple can earn more in one year than the total value of the 
tangible assets that exist at the time of divorce.4 In 1978, the median 
family income of the divorced couples studied was $20,000 per year; 
yet the median value of community property owned was $10,900; an 
amount it would take the same couple between six and seven months to 
earn.5 In families with incomes over $30,000, community property was 
equal to or greater than annual family income; however, "even there, it 
takes the average family less than two years to earn as much as their 
property is worth."6 Overall, "it takes the average divorced man about 
ten months to earn as much as the community's net worth.,,7 
If the major investment of the couple during the marriage is in 
building the earning capacity or career assets of one spouse, and that 
spouse retains the entire investment after divorce, the spouses are left 
with very unequal shares of the community assets. 8 Because it is 
generally the husband's career in which the couple choose to invest, the 
1. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECfED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 53 (1986). 
2.ld. 
3. ld. at 55. 
4. ld. at 59, 60. 
5.ld. at 60. 
6.ld. 
7.ld. 
8. ld. at 110-112. See also, Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade of Development, 50 
Mo. L. REv. 259, 260-62 (1985). 
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omission of career assets and enhanced earning capacity from the 
definition of community property has a discriminatory impact on 
women. Most wives support (or "invest" in) their husband's career and 
earning potential; even in two-income or two-career families, it is 
usually the husband's career and earning potential that take priority.9 
Mter the birth of a child, it is often the wife who takes a less demanding 
or less than full-time job so that the husband can concentrate on his 
career; she also is to stay home with a sick child.lO The decision to give 
priority to the husband's career is usually seen as a rational economic 
choice, indeed a fmancial necessity, because most men earn significantly 
more than most women. When such decisions are made, couples 
generally decide to invest primarily in the career assets and earning 
potential of one spouse, rather than in the career of both parties or in 
other forms of property; they decide to have one spouse stay out of the 
paid labor market and concentrate on home making and childrearing. 
These career decisions are made jointly during marriage with the 
expectation that both will share equally in the fruits of their endeavors. 11 
When couples divorce, however, one party, typically the wife, loses the 
benefits of these joint decisions. 12 
Had the spouses used their time, resources, and income to purchase 
real property during the marriage, both would share equally in the value 
of that property at divorce. However, by instead investing in the career 
and earning potential of one spouse, the other spouse loses the entire 
investment at the time of divorce. The non-working spouse (usually the 
wife) who has invested in her spouse's career during marriage is 
penalized for a mutual, joint decision made during marriage, while the 
working spouse retains the full benefit of that joint decision. 
9. Krauskopf, supra note 8, at 260-26l. 
10. Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 17 
FAM. L. Q. 41, 41-43 (1983); Minton, Valuing the Contribution of the Homemaker at 
Trial, 1 Fairshare 7, 10 (Oct. 1981); Avner, Valuing Homemaker Work: An Alternative to 
Quantification, 4 Fairshare 11, 12 (Jan. 1984). Courts throughout the country have 
recognized that homemakers lose ground in the paid job market in order to enhance their 
spouses' career interests and pursuit of economic success. See, e.g., Parrott v. Parrott, 
292 S.E.2d 182-84 (S.C.1982); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382-83 (Utah 1980); LaRue 
v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312, 317; Steinke v. Steinke, 376 N.W.2d 839, 844 (Wis. 1985); 
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985). A recent 
study indicated that 82 percent of women do all or most of the housework, despite the fact 
that over half of women are in the paid labor force. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. 
DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT IN PERSPECfIVE: WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, Report 730 
(1986). Another study showed that employed wives spend 26 hours a week on housework, 
while their husbands spend 36 minutes. Cruver, Husbands and Housework: It's Still an 
Uneven Load, USA Today, Aug. 20, 1986, at 5D. 
11. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 112. 
12. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 111, 112. 
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The failure to divide enhanced earning capacity may be particularly 
acute in shorter marriages. Couples generally spend the early years of 
marriage planning and building for their family's future economic 
security and stability. Some couples base their future economic security 
on investments in tangible property, such as real estate. However, early 
in marriage, many families invest in career assets or career potential 
(i.e., education, training, etc.) as a means of providing for their future 
economic security. Where the marriage is of shorter duration, the 
investment in a spouse's career potential has usually not begun to pay 
off at the time of divorce. Since the average length of marriage is 7.5 
years,13 the family's major investment during the marriage often has not 
yet been transferred into tangible property. By permitting one spouse to 
leave the marriage with the entire earning potential, the other spouse 
may be denied the fruits of his or her investment during the marriage. 
Enhanced Earning Capacity and Other Career Assets as 
Community Property 
Career assets, including enhanced earning capacity, can be viewed 
as the product of investments in the human capital of the wage earning 
spouse. Those who object to the recognition of career assets and 
enhanced earning capacity as forms of property argue that these assets 
do not fit within the traditional view of property as something which has 
exchange value on the open market or is capable of sale, assignment, or 
transfer. However, as economist Philip Eden has noted, 
The enhanced earning capacity resulting from [education and 
training] is part of what economists call human capital. It is the 
capital value of a human being that is quite similar to the capital 
value of any machine or other piece of property. Both are 
13. NORTON & MOORMAN, Current Trends in Marriage and Divorce Among American 
Women, 49 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 3.6 (1987). It is also worth noting recent and 
complete information on such questions as the average length of marriage, the age of 
divorcing spouses, and the number of minor children involved is not readily available in 
California. Previous to 1977, such data was collected and published by the California 
Department of Social Services. However, in 1977, as a result of legislation, California 
ceased participation in the Divorce Registration and data collection effort conducted by 
the federal.govemment. The absence of California from this national data source makes it 
impossible to publish accurate "national" divorce statistics. In 1989 or 1990, the divorce 
data collection form used by states participating in the Divorce Registration Area effort 
will be revised to include information on the type of custody arrangement ordered. This 
might be an appropriate time for California to consider rejoining the national data 
collection effort and advocating for the registration form to include data on the amount of 
child and spousal support awarded. 
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measured in the same way, as the present value of the net 
income of the property over its useful life ... 
Human capital is just as real as any other form of capital. Indeed 
it is one of the most precious forms of property. . . . The 
ownership of eapital, in any form it takes, IS ownership of 
property .... Whether a given type of capital can be sold or 
transferred is of secondary importance. . . .Different forms and 
types of capital and property have varying degrees of salability, 
liquidity, or problems of realization. . . . These variations of 
form do not change their basic character as capital and 
property.I4 
A career that is built in the course of a marriage should be treated the 
same as real property accumulated during the marriage -- as community 
property subject to division -- because it is a product of the couple's 
joint efforts and resources. 15 In a leading decision on this issue, New 
York's highest court recently recognized career assets as marital 
property, holding that: 
the contributions of one spouse to the other's profession or 
career. .. represent investments in the economic partnership of 
the marriage and that the product of the parties' joint efforts, the 
professional license, should be considered marital property.16 
In its 1986 decision in 0' Brien, the New York Court of Appeal 
expressly rejected the argument that a career asset (such as a 
professional license ) is not property: 
[I]t is an overstatement to assert that a professionalli.cense could 
not be considered property even outside the context of [divorce]. 
A professional license is a valuable property right, reflected in 
the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended 
in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it 
affords its holder, which may not be revoked without due 
process oflaw ... (cites omitted). 17 
14. L. WEITZMAN. supra note 1. at 112. 
15. O'Brien v. O'Brien. 66 N.Y.2d 576. 586. 489 N.E.2d 712, 716. 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 
747 (1985). 
16. Eden & Herzos. Marital Investment in Education 10-12 (1985) (emphasis added). 
(unpublished paper submitted to the Task Force on Family Equity. Sept. 23, 1986). 
17. O'Brien v. O'Brien. 66 N.Y.2d 576,586.489 N.E.2d 712,717,498 N.Y.S.2d 743. 
748 (1985). 
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The cl,laracterization of human capital as an asset or property is 
commonly used in areas of law other than family law. For example, in 
wrongful death and tort actions, earning capacity has long been 
recognized as a valuable asset. If a husband dies in a wrongful death 
case~ the primary measure of loss to the wife would be the less of his 
human capital, i.e., the present value of his future earning capacity.18 In 
a divorce, the wife's loss is only her portion of the present value of his 
enhanced earning capacity resulting from their mutual investment during 
the marriage. Human capital should be treated in the same manner, 
whether it be in the context of a divorce case or a wrongful death or 
personal injury case. 19 
Earning Capacity Under Present California Law 
The argument that investments in the human capital of one spouse 
are not community property makes little sense in California, where other 
types of intangible career assets (e.g., nonvested pensions, business 
goodwill) are already recognized by law as community property.20 
Until 1984, California led the country in recognizing career assets, 
such as retirement benefits, profit sharing plans, and goodwill, as 
community property. However, in 1984, the California Legislature 
enacted Civil Code section 4800.3, putting a sudden halt to its inclusion 
of further career assets as community property. Pursuant to section 
4800.3, the "reimbursement method" of compensating a spouse for 
community contributions towards the education and training of the other 
spouse, which restricts a spouse's entitlement to share this community 
asset, is "the exclusive remedy of the community or a party."21 
Current California law is therefore one of the most restrictive laws in 
the country in its treatment of education, degrees, training and its 
resulting enhanced earning capacity. In some states enhanced earning 
capacity is expressly recognized as a community asset.22 In other states 
where earning capacity is not recognized as marital property,23 the 
courts are not bound by the "equal division of property" rule and can, 
18. Eden & Herzos, supra note 16, at 12-13. 
19.1d. 
20. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
633 (1976); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App.3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974). 
21. CAL. avo CODE § 4800.3(d). 
22. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 
(1985). 
23. The Scoreboard, 9 FAMILY ADVOCATE, No.2, 7-8 (Fall 1986). This article describes 
how appellate courts in 29 jurisdictions treat professional degrees and enhanced earning 
capacity. 
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therefore, award more than half of other marital property to compensate 
a contributing spouse.24 
California's treatment of earning capacity under Civil Code Section 
4800.3 is discriminatory in two ways. First, this particular asset is 
arbitrarily treated differently from all other forms of community assets. 
If a spouse were to contribute towards the purchase of real estate, he or 
she would not be limited to recouping only the actual dollar investment. 
Instead, the spouse would share equally in the appreciated value of that 
property. 
Similarly, any enhancement of separate or community property 
occurring during the marriage through the efforts, time, skills of one or 
both spouses is considered by law to be community property subject to 
division upon dissolution.25 The only asset not treated similarly is the 
most valuable asset acquired by California spouses---the earning power 
of one spouse acquired during the marriage. This can result in 
enrichment of, if not a windfall for, the spouse who fully retains that 
asset. 
Second, Civil Code section 4800.3 discriminates against 
homemakers who, while not making actual dollar contributions towards 
their husbands' careers and earning potential, make nonmonetary 
contributions via their homemaking, household management, 
childrearing and other social skills to maintain the family structure. The 
statute only permits reimbursement for "payments made . . . for 
education or training."26 
Thus, only actual monetary contributions toward a spouse's 
enhanced earning capacity are reimbursable; nonmonetary contributions 
are ignored. This refusal to recognize nonmonetary homemaking 
contributions is contrary to the treatment of these types of contributions 
with respect to all other forms of community assets. With respect to all 
other community property assets, homemaking contributions are 
considered equal to monetary contributions towards the acquisition of 
those assets, and the homemaker shares equally in the full value of that 
asset.27 
24. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Wilcox, 365 N.E.2d 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Hughes v. 
Hughes, 438 So.2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Horstmann v. Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 
885 (Iowa 1978); Ellesmere v. Ellesmere, 359 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (husband 
who had made no career or educational sacrifices in support of his wife's education not 
entitled to equitable recovery of her support and educational expenses); Washburn v. 
Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984). 
25. See Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 250 P.2d 730 (1952). 
26. CAL. Cry. CODE § 4800.3(a) (emphasis added). 
27. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 
(1976); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974). 
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The inequitable nature of California's "reimbursement" method, 
compared to New York's "marital property" treatment, can be illustrated 
by referring to the facts of 0' Brien. The trial court in 0' Brien 
determined both the value of the wife's direct monetary contributions 
towards her husband's medical degree ($103,390), and the present 
value of the degree as marital property ($472,000). Under California's 
"reimbursement" method, Ms. O'Brien would only have been entitled to 
one-half of the $103,390. Under New York law, where the degree is 
marital property, she was entitled to a share of $472,000. 
Valuation and Division Issues 
Arguments that earning capacity cannot be valued and divided upon 
divorce are insupportable in the face of the characterization and valuation 
by California courts of other types of intangible career assets, such as 
pension rights, retirement benefits and business goodwill. Goodwill in 
a professional practice, which is community property in California, is in 
fact the earning potential of the professional maintaining the practice.28 
For example, determining the present value of career assets, including 
future earning capacity, is no more difficult or confusing than the type 
of valuation now required for the valuation of other career assets such as 
nonvested pensions, or for determining "reimbursement" value under 
Civil Code section 4800.3. In fact, valuation under section 4800.3 may 
prove more difficult than determining the present value of enhanced 
earning capacity. Under section 4800.3, a spouse is required to prove 
"payments made" for contributions toward a spouse's education and 
training. The spouse who did not obtain a degree, but contributed 
toward her or his spouse's ability to earn a degree, therefore, needs 
receipts or proof of actual costs. However, many costs and 
contributions cannot be accounted for, such as typing of papers, baby-
sitting costs, etc. It is unclear whether the spouse who did not obtain a 
degree has to forgo reimbursement for these types of "contributions", or 
can present expert testimony on the value of such contributions. 
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court's attempt to interpret section 
4800.3 has led to confusion concerning which contributions are 
reimbursable and whether "compensation" means more than dollar for 
dollar reimbursement. 29 
28. See In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1984). 
29. See 1.S. Shapiro, 'Who/e'-ly Imprecise in California, FAMILY ADVOCATE, supra note 
23, at 30, 32-34 (criticizing In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal.3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 
209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984». 
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Professional accountants and appraisers regularly engage in 
valuation of human capital, including future earning capacity. In 
0' Brien, the New York trial court determined the lifetime value of the 
husband's medical license by considering evidence pertaining to the 
husbMd's age. entry int6 practice, residency specialty, and capitalizing 
the earning differential between a college graduate and the earnings of a 
general surgeon over the productive life expectancy of the husband (i.e., 
to age 65). The lifetime value of the husband's earning capacity as a 
result of the medical license was then discounted down to a "present 
value." The court stated that: 
although fixing the present value of that enhanced earning 
capacity may present problems, the problems are not 
insurmountable. Certainly they are no more difficult than 
computing tort damages for wrongful death or diminished 
earning capacity resulting from injury and they differ only in 
degree from the problems presented when valuing a professional 
practice ... something the courts have not hesitated to do.3o 
Arguments against characterizing earning capacity as community 
property based on difficulty of distribution of the asset are also 
unsupportable. California courts already employ various methods that 
could be used for distributing career assets, including installment 
payments, reservation of jurisdiction, etc. (The trial court in O'Brien 
ordered Mr. O'Brien to pay Mrs. O'Brien her share of the value of the 
medical degree in 11 annual installments). Thus, distribution and 
valuation problems do not justify denying a spouse his or her right and 
interest in an asset that she or he has invested in during the marriage. 
Spousal Support in Lieu of Property is Inequitable 
Some have argued that a spouse's compensation for his or her 
investment in the other spouse's earning capacity should be limited to 
spousal support awards. This is an inequitable and inadequate remedy. 
This method was expressly rejected by the New York court in O'Brien: 
Limiting a working spouse to a [spousal support] award, either 
general or rehabilitative, not only is contrary to the economic 
partnership concept underlying the statute but also retains the 
uncertain and inequitable economic ties of dependence that the 
30. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 588, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 
749 (1985). 
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Legislature sought to extinguish by equitable distribution. 
[Spousal support]is subject to termination upon the recipient's 
remarriage and a working spouse may never receive adequate 
consideration for his or her contribution and may even be 
penalized for the decision to remarry if that is the only method of 
compensating the contribution .... 31 
In many cases, the spouse who has helped the other spouse obtain 
enhanced earning potential may not qualify for spousal support because 
she or he has been working outside the home. Indeed, that spouse may 
have provided the sole or primary financial support for the family during 
the other spouse's education or training. The contributing spouse may 
already be earning at a level commensurate with his or her reasonable 
needs, or even marital standard of living, and be deemed by the court to 
not need spousal support. Thus, the fact that the "contributing spouse" 
was working outside the home in order to permit the other spouse to 
pursue his or her career potential could defeat the need for spousal 
support; the "contributing spouse" would receive nothing on his or her 
investment. 
Division of property is based on an entitlement -- a spouse's right to 
share in the community assets -- not because that share is needed, but 
because the asset represents the capital product of the marital 
partnership. Using spousal support as a means of compensating a 
spouse for his or her contributions toward acquisition of marital assets 
is contrary to California law; in no other instance is a spouse required to 
receive his or her share of a community asset via spousal support. 
Another argument made against defining enhanced earning capacity 
as community property is that the spouse awarded a share of the other's 
earning capacity will be "double dipping" if she is also awarded spousal 
support based on consideration of that same earning capacity. This 
issue has been raised before with respect to division of other types of 
career assets such as pension rights. This concern is unfounded 
because property awards typically reduce the supported spouse's "need" 
for support. Section 4801(c)(3) expressly requires the court to consider 
the "obligations and assets" of each spouse in determining whether to 
award support and, if so, how much. A property award of enhanced 
earning capacity would constitute an "asset." In addition, the property 
award of enhanced earning capacity would reduce the supporting 
spouse's "ability to pay." In many cases, a property award of enhanced 
earning capacity will eliminate spousal support altogether. In the 
31.1d. at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. 
108 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. [VOL. 2.93 1990] 
0' Brien case, Mrs. O'Brien received no spousal support award because 
of her property award. In California, courts already have experience in 
dividing career assets such as pensions and taking that property into 
consideration when determining the need for spousal support. 
Task Force Proposals 
The Task Force proposals pertammg to community property 
recognize that career assets, including enhanced earning capacity, 
acquired during the marriage are a valuable joint acquisition for 
California families. The intended goals of California's divorce law 
reforms of treating husbands and wives equally and treating marriage as 
a partnership of equals, cannot be realized unless "community property" 
is defined broadly to include these assets. As explained in O'Brien, 
few undertakings during a marriage better qualify as the type of 
joint effort that the statute's economic partnership theory is 
intended to address than contributions toward one spouse's 
acquisition of a professional license. Working spouses are often 
required to contribute substantial income as wage-earners, 
sacrifice their own educational or career goals and opportunities 
for child rearing, perform the bulk of household duties and 
responsibilities and forego the acquisition of marital assets that 
could have been accumulated if the professional spouse had been 
employed rather than occupied with the study and training 
necessary to acquire a professionallicense.32 
The Task Force is, therefore, recommending two legislative 
proposals that address the need to include these assets in the division of 
community property at divorce. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION 
1. That community property be broadly defined to include all forms 
of property and assets, tangible and intangible, including all career 
assets. 
2. That enhanced earning capacity acquired during marriage be 
characterized as community property and subject to division upon 
dissolution. 
32.M. at 585,489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. 
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IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Amend the California Civil Code definition of community 
property33 to include a statement of legislative intent that community 
property is intended to be broadly deflned. In effect, this legislation 
would create a presumption that all forms of property and assets, 
tangible and intangible, acquired during marriage are to be considered 
community property. (Legislative Proposal #2) 
2. Repeal California Civil Code section 4800.3 ("reimbursement" 
for contributions towards professional education and training), and 
replace it with a new statute defIning enhanced earning capacity acquired 
during marriage as community property subject to division at divorce. 
Professional degrees, training and licenses are expressly included. 
Consideration of separate property contributions is expressly required. 
(Legislative Proposal #3) 
33. CAL. CIY. CODE § 5110. 
110 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. [VOL. 2.93 1990] 
V 
CHILD SUPPORT 
FINDINGS 
Inadequate child support award levels and noncompliance with 
support orders have been described as a national disgrace and scandal.1 
It has led Congress to enact the Child Support Enforcement 
Amendments of 1984, Public Law 93-378. In addition, the California 
Legislature has enacted a number of child support bills during the last 
three years in an attempt to address problems with both the adequacy of 
and compliance with orders. Two of the most far reaching bills were 
the Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984, which established 
minimum child support award levels, and Senate Bill 1751 (Hart), 
which provided for mandatory wage assignments in all child support 
orders after January 1, 1987. 
Much of the child support legislation has been based on the 
recognition that divorce is relegating millions of children to a diminished 
standard of living, and often even to a poverty level existence. Children 
residing with their mothers alone are almost five times as likely to be 
living below the poverty level as are children in two-parent families. In 
1984,3.1 million (45.7%) of the nation's female-headed single-parent 
families were living below the poverty level, as compared to 194,000 
(18%) of male-headed single-parent families and 9.4% of two-parent 
families. 2 
Nor is this problem abating: census data reveals that the number of 
children living in single-parent households is steadily rising. In 1970, 
about 12% of the nation's children lived in single-parent homes. By 
1985, that figure had almost doubled: 23% of the nation's 62.5 million 
children under the age of 18 were living with one parent, and 90 percent 
of the time that parent was the mother. 3 
California especially has been impacted by the growth in female-
headed households; in 1983 California had the highest number of such 
1. See L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND EcONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 262-263 (1986) (citing Margaret 
Heckler, Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). 
2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, Current Characteristics of the 
Population Below the Poverty Line, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (Series P-60, March 
1985). 
3.Id. 
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households in the United States.4 Following a nation-wide trend, the 
number of female-headed households with children under age 18 in 
California has steadily increased from 565,000 in 1977 to 648,000 in 
1986. Of these 648,000 families, 46% live on incomes below the 
poverty level.5 
Award Levels in California 
In 1984, recognizing the inadequacy of child support awards, the 
California Legislature enacted the Agnos Child Support Standards Act 
establishing mandatory support guidelines.6 This Act was intended to 
raise the level of support awards. However, there is currently very little 
data available to measure the impact of the new law. Many observers 
provide anecdotal evidence of increases in support award levels 
(especially district attorneys representing AFDC recipients). Yet, the 
Task Force also found indications that the Agnos Act may not be 
fulfilling, in all cases, its promise of higher, equitable awards. For 
example, the Task Force received complaints from attorneys and parents 
that some courts are using the Agnos "mandatory minimum support 
level" as a cap or ceiling on child support awards.7 Furthermore, some 
data suggests that California child support awards remain inadequate. 
The January - March 1986 Quarterly Report of the Child Support 
Management System, submitted to the Governor by the California 
Department of Social Services, showed the average monthly child 
support payment collected by district attorneys' offices to be $159.74 
($151.22 in AFDC cases; $167.69 in non-AFDC cases).8 This amount 
is less than the national median child support payment reported by the 
1983 Census Survey of approximately $195 per month ($2,340 
4. W. DIXON, ClllLD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: UNEQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW 9, 
(1985); see also, NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON ClllLD SUPPORT, REPORT 5-6, Table B. 
(Oct. 1, 1985). 
5. CALIFORNIA STATE CENSUS DATA CENTER, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, reported in 
Ann DuBay and Jack Hailey, Family Income in California 6-7 (California Senate Office of 
Research, March 1987). 
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4720 (West 1984). 
7. See, e.g., Public Hearing Record, Hearings Before the Senate Task Force on Family 
Equity, (Written Testimony of M. Baker-Davidson and A. Bailey) (Oct. 16, 1986); Letter 
from George H. Norton, Esq., to Senate Judiciary Committee (Oct. 7, 1986). 
8. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, JANUARy-MARCH QUARTERLY REPORT ON ClllLD 
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, Table 13. 
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annually),9 and is only slightly higher than the U.S. poverty guideline 
of $150 per month per child. 10 
Compliance Problems/Lack of Awards 
In addition to low award levels, a large number of c1u1dren in single-
parent homes receive no child support either because a court-ordered 
award has not been obtained (or cannot be made) or because awards are 
not enforced. As of 1984, 42 percent of women living alone with 
children had no child support order.H Of the 58 percent who did have 
court support orders and were due payments, only half (29 percent) 
received full payment. Of the remaining 29 percent entitled to receive 
support, 26 percent received only partial payment and 24 percent 
received absolutely no support payments.12 It should be noted that one-
half of parents with current support orders do make their payments 
regularly and in full. However, the parents that do not meet their 
support obligation place an unfair and very expensive burden on the 
children, the custodial parent, and the taxpayer. 
Failure to Pay 
A correlation exists between a parent's failure to pay child support 
and the child's receipt of public assistance. Almost 90 percent of the 
children who are receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) have a living parent absent from the home who is either paying 
insufficient child support or none at alL 13 When the AFDC program 
was started in the 1930s, death of a parent was the major criterion for 
eligibility. In 1940, 42 percent of the AFDC caseload were families 
with a parent absent because of death. By 1979, families eligible for 
AFDC due to death of a parent accounted for only 2.2 percent of the 
total caseload.14 Thus, along with the custodial mother, the taxpayer 
has become a major provider for children of unwed or divorced parents. 
9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Child Support and Alimony: 1983 CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, 2 (Series P-23, No. 141). 
10.50 Fed. Reg. 9517-18 (1985). See also, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9, at Series 
P-23, No. 141. 
11. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 9, at 1. 
12. [d. 
13. MAXIMUS, INc., EVALUATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: FINAL 
REPORT (prepared for Office of Research and Statistics) (Soc. Sec. Administration Contract 
No. 600-82-0089 ES-l) (Apr. 1983). See also W. DIXON, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: 
UNEQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW 5 (1985). 
14. [d. 
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Fathers' financial inability to pay child support is not the major 
cause for families being forced onto welfare rolls. Census data shows 
that child support payments constitute only 13 percent of the average 
male's income in 1978, 1981, and 1984.15 Contrary to popular myth, 
studies show little relationship between a father's ability to pay child 
support and either the amount of support ordered or the rate of 
compliance with the order. As pointed out by Professor Weitzman: 
Chamber's data from Michigan and our data from California 
indicate that most divorced fathers could comply with the court 
orders and still live quite well after doing so. Every study of 
men's ability to pay arrives at the same conclusion: the money is 
there. Indeed, there is normally enough to permit payment of 
significantly higher awards than are currently being made. 16 
That financial inability to pay is not the primary cause of 
noncompliance is further evidenced by the fact that higher income 
fathers are just as likely not to meet their support obligation as low 
income fathers. Fathers earning $30,000 to $50,000 are as likely not to 
comply with court orders for child support as fathers with incomes 
under $10,000.17 
Moreover, research provides little or no support for the argument 
that noncompliance is related to visitation problems. While 
noncompliance with child support orders is prevalent, the great majority 
of fathers appear to be satisfied with visitation arrangements. For 
example, 
[a] recent study of randomly selected noncustodial fathers with 
cases active in the North Carolina IV-D system found that the 
fathers were substantially satisfied with their visitation. Only 8 
percent of AFDC fathers and 13 percent of non-AFDC fathers 
reported visitation problems. The fathers were specifically 
asked about complaints concerning frequency or duration of 
visits, or interference by the mother, and none of these 
complaints were reported to any significant extent. 18 
15. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 9, at 2. 
16. L. WEITZMAN, supra note I, at 295. 
17. [d. at 296. See also THE WHITE HOUSE: ADMINISTRATION ACTIVITIES ON ISSUES OF 
IMPoRTANCE TO WOMEN, 25 (Feb. 15, 1983). 
18. Po1ikoff, Custody and Visitation: Their Relationship to Establishing and Enforcing 
Support, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 274, 275 (1985), (reporting on HASKINS, 
DoBELSTEIN, AKiN AND SCHWARTZ, EsTIMATES OF NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTIONS 
POTENTIAL AND THE INCOME SECURITY OF FEMALE-HEADED FAMILIES, FINAL REPORT (Office 
of Child Support Enforcement, 1985). 
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A study done in Travis County, Texas, where the county enforces 
visitation orders as well as support orders, found that: 
in 1983 there were 13,808 complaints of support delinquency 
ana only 740 complaints concerning denial of visitation. 
Furthermore, mothers appear to respond much more 
cooperatively after visitation complaints are ftled than fathers do 
after support delinquency complaints are filed. [citation 
omitted] 19 
Professor Weitzman also noted the lack of relationship between 
visitation problems and compliance with support orders: 
Here again the empirical data directly contradict the assertion: 
there is no correlation between compliance and complaints about 
visitation .... [M]en with no visitation problems are just as 
likely not to pay child support as they are likely to pay .... 
[M]en who comply with child support awards are just as likely 
as those who do not comply to say they have some visitation 
problems. Canadian researchers similarly report the lack of a 
statistically significant relationship between visitation and 
compliance.20 
Regardless of why so many fathers have not complied with support 
orders, it is apparent that too many have not been required by the legal 
system to do SO.21 
In the end the current legal system places the economic 
responsibility for children on their mothers and allows fathers 
the "freedom" to choose not to support their children.22 
19.1d. 
20. L. WEITZMAN, supra note I, at 297. 
21. See generally D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979); L. WEITZMAN, supra note 
I, at 298-307, 321-22. Some researchers have noted that among small groups of fathers 
studied (non-random samples) those who were heavily involved in childrearing had better 
payment rates. However, research is inconclusive as to whether a strong interest in the 
children leads to both large amounts of time spent with the children and a desire to insure 
payments are made, or if time spent with the children itself encourages payments. 
22. L. WEITZMAN, supra note I, at 321. 
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Enforcement in California 
In California, enforcement of support is a major problem. At the 
end of 1986, delinquent child support payments in this state amounted 
to $1.25 billion.23 The actual debt is even higher as this figure incilliks 
only those cases on file with district attorneys' offices. Cases in which 
the custodial parent is not aware of the district attorney's enforcement 
services or has given up on trying to collect are not reflected in these 
figures. In 1984, the California district attorneys' support enforcement 
units initiated actions in 1,002,917 cases (670,737 AFDC cases; 
332,180 non-AFDC cases).24 This number constituted the largest 
caseload of any state. Caseloads in the next two highest states were 
significantly less in volume. New York had 646,314 and Michigan had 
630,595 cases.25 While many California district attorneys are deserving 
of compliment for handling such high caseloads, this effort must be 
enhanced to meet the enforcement needs of California's children. 
The Task Force received testimony, oral and written, critical of the 
California support enforcement effort.26 The testimony raised issues 
concerning rudeness and delay in the system, and echoed a concern that 
widely disparate attitudes and practices are displayed by public 
enforcement agencies and judges from county to county.27 In addition, 
it became painfully clear that the district attorney support enforcement 
units, no matter how dedicated their efforts, lack adequate staff and 
resources to handle the overwhelming numbers of child support cases. 
At the Task Force public hearing much concern was also voiced 
over testimony that California is forty-seventh in the nation in child 
support collections.28 This comparison is based on figures disseminated 
by the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) and has 
been attacked by district attorneys as misleading. Although some 
witnesses believed this study related to total collections, in fact, the 
figure is a ratio of collections on welfare cases to total welfare grants. 
In collections on welfare cases, California has stood consistently as 
number one in the country. However, because California's AFDC grant 
23. Left Holding the Bag, Sacramento Magazine, Dec. 12, 1986, 12. 
24. FEDERAL OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, 1983-1984, Tables 21-22. 
25.ld. 
26. See, e.g., Public Hearing Record, supra note 7, Testimony of Stephanie Paul; Susan 
Spier on behalf of Single Parents United 'N' Kids (SPUNK); Gloria Allred, Esq. 
27. See Public Hearing Record, supra note 7, Testimony of Susan Spier on behalf of 
SPUNK; Letter from Susan Spier to Michael E. Barber (Nov. 3, 1986.). 
28. Dodson & Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984: New Tools 
for Enforcement, 10 FAM. L. REP. 3051, 3057 (Oct. 23, 1984). 
116 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. [VOL. 2.93 1990] 
level is higher than that of most other states, the ratio of its collections 
on AFDC cases to the total amount of AFDC grants is lower than that of 
most other states. Also, California has been third in the nation in a state 
by state comparison of collections on non-welfare cases. In relation to 
our total population, California's collections are significantly larger in 
proportion to national collections than is California's population relative 
to the national population.29 The OCSE publications and statistics focus 
on welfare recoupment, which is merely one facet of child support 
enforcement, one which has recently been deemphasized by the federal 
government. In fact the 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments 
recognize that a significant method of reducing poverty is to concentrate 
on the collection of support in non-welfare cases, thereby preventing 
families from going on welfare.3D 
Proposals 
The Task Force made a number of recommendations for legislation, 
research and administrative changes which are detailed in the following 
sections. These proposals address the continuing need for child support 
awards to be sufficient to adequately cover the cost of raising children 
and to enhance the enforcement capability of district attorneys' offices. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATION 
1. CHILD SUPPORT TO AGE 21 
All parents should be legally obligated to support their otherwise 
unemancipated children to age 21. This would facilitate children's 
pursuit of college education or other training, and guarantee that in 
divorced families both parents equally share the burden of supporting 18 
to 21 year old children as would occur if the parents were married. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
Amend Civil Code sections 196.5,4700, and 4700.9 to require all 
parents to support their unemancipated children to age 21. (Legislative 
Proposal #6) 
29. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, FISCAL YEAR 1986 10TH ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS, Vol. n, 3, Table 4. 
30. 45 CFR 301-05, 307 Fed. Reg. (May 9, 1985), Part n, Dept. of Health and Human 
Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement. See also Judy Mann, Child Support, The 
Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1983. 
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DISCUSSION 
Current law,31 by terminating child support when a child reaches age 
18 or graduates from high school, exacerbates the impoverishment of 
chilGren by divorce and has a negative impact on children's ptlfSWt of 
higher education or advanced training. In tum, the lack of education has 
adverse consequences on the children's future employment 
oppo~unities.32 Many 18 to 21 year-olds continue to live at home or 
receive financial assistance from their parents while attending college, 
vocational training, or working at low-paying jobs. According to recent 
Census Bureau studies, 
[a]mong the 18-24-year-old crowd, 60 percent of men and 48 
percent of women lived at home or in college dorms in 1985. 
That's up from 54 percent of men and 43 percent of women in 
1980 and 52 percent and 41 percent in 1970.33 
In the two-parent "intact" family, the responsibility of supporting 
these young adults is shared equally by both parents. In the divorced or 
single-parent family, the responsibility is unequally borne entirely by 
one parent, usually the custodial mother, because the noncustodial 
parent's legal obligation of child support has terminated when the child 
reaches age 18. This unequal burden of supporting 18 to 21 year-old 
children comes at a time when the divorced or single mother is least able 
to afford the additional support costs. Her ability to seek higher-paid 
employment is diminishing because of her age, and spousal support, if 
awarded, has generally ended by the time the child reaches age 18.34 
Other minor siblings for whom support is being paid are also 
affected by the termination of support for the 18 year-old. The child 
support awarded for the minor children must be spread to cover the 
additional sibling for whom support has ended. This situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that the Agnos Child Support Standards Act 
support awards are based on the number of minor children in the 
household (rather than, for example, upon the household's needs). 
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196.5. 
32. See, e.g., Wallerstein, Women After Divorce: Preliminary Report from a lO-Year 
Follow-Up, 56 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 65-77 (1986). 
33. Sacramento Bee, Feb. 2, 1987, A-ll, and reported in the February edition of 
American Demographics magazine. See also, Public Hearing Record, supra note 7, 
Written Testimony of K. Dumont. 
34. Wallerstein & Corbin, Father-Child Relationships After Divorce: Child Support and 
Educational Opportunity, 20 FAM. QrLY 109, 110, 111 (1986). 
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Failure to provide support at the time children are to enter college 
has a detrimental effect on the children's pursuit and attainment of a 
college education or advanced training. The results of the very limited 
research done in this area raise concerns about the willingness of fathers 
to pay college expenses. In a 10~year follow-up studyef divor~-ed 
families in Marin County, Dr. Judith Wallerstein and Shauna Corbin 
found that the majority of the mostly middle-class and affluent fathers 
she studied were refusing to financially assist their children in obtaining 
college educations. The data showed that: 
fathers who had maintained contact with their children over the 
decade, who had supported them with regularity and who were 
well able to continue supporting them financially, failed to do so 
at the time when their youngsters' economic and educational 
preparation for adulthood was at stake. These changes in 
parental support have lifelong ramifying implications for 
children in divorced families. 35 
This study revealed "an unexpected finding of a downward 
economic and social trend and disadvantaging of a significant number of 
these young people from middle-class families as they stand on the 
threshold of adulthood."36 The fathers studied were financially able to 
support their children in college: fifty-three percent of the fathers were 
professionals and another twenty-seven percent were businessmen in 
executive positions or owners of small businesses. 
[1]t is difficult to explain the reluctance of economically stable, 
even affluent, fathers who remained in regular contact with their 
youngsters, who valued education and economic success, and 
who were no longer in active conflict with their former wives, to 
support and encourage high aspirations in their sons and 
daughters. Few men claimed inability to pay; very few 
expressed disinterest in their children. Most of these fathers 
indicated that they had met their legal obligations over many 
years and that their responsibilities had ended. They did not 
confront the issue that many of these young people, by virtue of 
their social class and the mores of their community, would have 
been substantially supported through their college years as a 
matter of course had the marriage remained intact.37 
35. [d. 
36. [d. at 109-10. 
37. [d. at 125. 
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Currently, the only means by which a custodial parent can guarantee 
that the noncustodial parent will financially contribute towards a child's 
college education is by a written voluntary agreement. Many divorcing 
women "bargain away" spousal support and other property rights in 
exchange for the father's written agreement to assist with colkg~ 
expenses.38 Such bargaining may serve to further lower the mother and 
child's standard of living during the child's minority. 
The Task Force is recommending that the age to which parents owe 
a legal duty of support to their children be raised from age 18 to age 21. 
The recommendation provides the fairest and simplest method for 
protecting all children in a non-discriminatory manner. The Task 
Force's proposal treats all parents and children equally. Divorced, 
married and unwed parents would all have the same legal obligation to 
support their unemancipated children to age 21. The Task Force 
proposal guarantees that all unemancipated children, whether from poor 
or wealthy families, college-educated or not, would be entitled to the 
same right of support. And, the Task Force proposal promotes the 
state's interest in guaranteeing that children of divorce are treated 
similarly to children in nuclear, two-parent families: 
In allowing for divorce, the State undertakes to protect its 
victims .... A number of courts adopt the policy that a child 
should not suffer because his parents are divorced. The child of 
divorced parents should be in no worse position than a child 
from an unbroken home whose parents could be expected to 
supply a college education .... Parents, when deprived of the 
custody of their children, very often refuse to do for such 
children what natural instinct would ordinarily prompt them to 
do ... .In most cases the father, who is the one who holds the 
purse strings, and whose earning capacity is greater than that of 
the mother, is the one who is able to give the minor a proper 
education.39 
The Task Force proposal does not directly address the issue of 
college expenses. The proposal merely extends the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court to order support to age 21. However, by 
extending the court's jurisdiction to age 21, the court would have the 
discretionary power to award support sufficient to cover college needs 
on a case-by-case basis. 
38. L. WEITZMAN, supra note I, at 280-81. 
39. Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 602,603, 575 P.2d 201, 207, 208 (1978). 
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The Task Force proposal also extends the parental legal right of 
custody and control over a child to whom support is owed. Thus, a 
child between the ages of 18 and 21 years must submit to parental 
control and custody if he or she is to be entitled to support. There is 
someC{)flCem that the Task Force proposal could affect an 18-to-21 year 
old's legal rights as an adult, or parental liability for the acts of the 18-
to-21 year old. However, the Task Force proposal raises the age of 
"minority" to age 21 for child support purposes only. Section (b) of the 
Task Force proposal clearly states that the definition of "minor" or 
"child" as one less than twenty-one years of age, only applies with 
respect to Chapter 1 of Title 1 of the Civil Code (sections 196, et. seq.). 
Thus, the Task Force proposal does not and is not intended to change 
the age of majority for any other purpose but child support. An 18-to-
21 year old's legal rights and responsibilities as an adult, such as the 
right to contract, are unaffected by the Task Force proposal. In 
addition, parental liability for acts of an 18-to-21 year old adult are not 
extended or affected. The Legislature may wish to clarify the intention 
not to extend parental liability or interfere with an 18-to-21 year old's 
legal rights and responsibilities by adding an express provision to the 
proposed legislation. 
The Task Force proposal is simple to enforce and does not create 
additional difficulties for district attorneys' support enforcement units. 
Experience in other states shows that laws providing child support only 
if a child is attending college can result in substantial litigation over such 
issues as whether the child is a full or part-time student, whether the 
child should be attending a private or public college, or whether the 
family "background" justifies the child attending college. Whether or 
not the 18-to-21 year old child had been emancipated would be the only 
issue open to litigation under the Task Force proposal. 
The Task Force proposal is retroactive. All existing child support 
orders would continue in effect until the child reaches age 21 or is 
emancipated as defined within the proposed statute. Retroactivity is 
consistent with the parens patriae power of the state to protect children's 
best interests; since child support orders can always be modified, 
retroactivity does not violate constitutional due process requirements. 
The Task Force proposal is consistent with the national trend 
recognizing that young people who reach age 18 should not, for all 
purposes, be considered adults. For example, the federal government 
recently raised the age for buying and serving alcoholic beverages to age 
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21.40 Furthermore, Indiana, Missouri, New York, and Oregon require 
parents to support their children until age 21, and Iowa requires child 
support to age 22 for children regularly attending schoo1.41 
2. HARDSHIP DEDUCTION UNDER AGNOS CHILD 
SUPPORT GUIDELINES 
In the determination of child support awards, the amount a 
supporting parent may deduct for the children with whom she/he 
resides should not be more than the amount paid to the children subject 
to the support order being determined. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
1. Amend California Civil Code section 4725(b) to provide for 
uniformity in application of the hardship deductions for "minimum 
basic living expenses" of dependent natural or adopted children 
residing with the obligor-parent. (Legislative Proposal #7). 
2. Amend California Civil Code section 4721(c)(5) to permit 
deduction for voluntary child support payments for natural or 
adopted children not the subject of a court order, provided 
however that said deduction does not exceed the applicable county 
support schedule amounts. (Legislative Proposal #7). 
DISCUSSION 
The Agnos Child Support Standards Act42 permits courts to deviate 
from the formula utilized to calculate the actual monthly child support 
payment and reduce the amount of the child support obligation in several 
ways. Among them are: 
1. Deductions for Prior Orders. Section 4721(c)(5) allows the 
obligor-parent to reduce his or her gross monthly income by the 
40. 23 u.s.c. § 158 (Supp. 1989) (five percent of federal highway funds shall be 
withheld from any state in which it is lawful for a person less than twenty-one years of age 
to purchase or publicly possess any alcoholic beverage). 
41. IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-12(d) (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.340 (Vernon 
1990) (child support obligation continues until the child reaches his or her twenty-second 
birthday, if the child is enrolled in an institution of vocation or higher education 
following high school graduation); NEW YORK DOM. REL. LAW §§32(3) (McKinney Supp. 
1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108(4) (child attending school); IOWA CODE ANNOT. § 
598.1(2) (Supp. 1989) (child in school). 
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4270 (West 1984). 
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amount of child or spousal support being paid pursuant to a court 
order for children of a prior marriage or relationship (i.e., "fIrst 
family" deduction). 
2. Hardship Deductions. Section 4725(b) permits the court to 
reduce the amount of a child support award for the "fIrst faniIly" 
calculated under Section 4722 by permitting the obligor to deduct, 
"basic minimum living expenses" of dependent children (i.e., 
"second family" deduction). 
The basis for enacting the Agnos Child Support Standards Act was 
to limit judicial discretion in setting child support awards. The 
Legislature found that courts were not using their discretion to insist on 
adequate child support awards. However, the discretionary "hardship 
deduction" under section 4725(b) is developing into another loophole 
for lowering child support awards. Legislation is needed to narrow this 
loophole by limiting the amounts and types of expenses allowable for 
hardship deductions under section 4725(b). 
On its face, the "hardship deduction" (Civil Code section 4725(b» 
discriminates against children of prior or "first" relationships. In 
determining the amount of the "hardship deduction," the court is not 
required to consider the income of the other parent with whom the 
children reside (i.e., the second spouse's income). However, in 
determining the obligor-parent's support obligation for children of a 
prior marriage or relationship, the Agnos formula requires consideration 
of both parents' income. Thus, while the obligor-parent's support 
obligation to "fIrst family" children is reduced because of the custodial 
parent's income, no similar treatment of the second spouse's income is 
applied in calculating the "hardship deduction". 
The Task Force believed that no "hardship deduction" should be 
permitted for children residing with the obligor-parent. As a matter of 
public policy, the Task Force considered that the support rights and 
needs of children of a prior marriage or relationship (i.e., "fIrst family") 
must receive priority over the support of children of subsequent 
relationships who are residing with the obligor-parent. This public 
policy encourages and requires an obligor-parent to assume 
responsibility for his or her existing children and obligations before 
taking on new and additional responsibilities. The issue is not whether 
children of different relationships are entitled to equal support from the 
obligor-parent. Instead, this policy recognizes that the support of 
second families is undertaken with prior knowledge of existing 
obligations to the children of the obligor-parent's previous marriage or 
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relationship. Thus, the Task Force believes that children of a prior 
family or relationship should not have to suffer the consequences of the 
obligor-parent's unilateral decision to assume new family 
responsi bili ties. 
While the Task Force believed the "hardship dedllCtion" should be 
eliminated altogether, it realized that this may not be politically feasible 
at the current time. Therefore, the Task Force is recommending 
legislation that strictly defines the "hardship deduction" and provides for 
uniformity in application. The primary concern addressed by the Task 
Force's proposed legislation centers around the proper interpretation and 
degree of discretion allowed with respect to deductions for a hardship 
necessary to meet the "minimum basic living expenses of either parent's 
dependent minor children from other marriages or relationships," (Civil 
Code section 4725(b)). This section of the law raises two issues the 
legislation seeks to address. 
The first question is what child or children from other marriages or 
relationships should be allowed as a "hardship" deduction. Currently, 
children from other marriages or relationships supported pursuant to a 
support order are taken care of by a deduction from gross income under 
Civil Code section 4721(c)(5). Payments made for dependents not the 
subject of an order may be treated as a "hardship deduction," in 
consideration of children in the "second family." However, there may 
be children not part of the second family who are not the subject of an 
order to whom payments are made voluntarily. The support of these 
children, who most likely do not reside with the obligor parent but are 
from a previous marriage or relationship, may also under current law be 
treated as a "hardship" by the courts. The proposed legislation provides 
that if child support is actually paid for natural or adopted children not 
the subject of an order (voluntary payments), such children may be 
taken into consideration by an additional deduction from gross income 
rather than by a "hardship deduction," in the same manner as payments 
through a support order. A limitation on the extent of credit for such 
voluntary payments is included, capping the deduction at the applicable 
county support schedule amount. This change would continue to 
provide for all children of the obligated parent not living in such parent's 
home and not subject to a support order. The proposed legislation 
further provides that hardship deductions would apply-as they were 
intended to apply-to natural or adoptive children of the obligated parent 
only if they reside with such parent. 
The most pressing issue involves the amount of the deduction to be 
allowed under section 4725(b), relating to the hardship deduction to 
meet the "minimum basic living expenses" of resident children. As 
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illustrated in Table 1, infra p. 126, a great degree of variance in the 
amount of the deduction allowed by courts exists in direct contravention 
to the stated goal of the statute (Civil Code section 4720(a), (b), and (d» 
to provide for uniformity in the determination of child support awards 
among similarly situated families. The degree of variance in 
implementing this deduction may best be expressed by a simple 
example. Suppose a support order must be made in the following 
circumstances: the custodial parent (mother) has two children in 
common with the noncustodial parent (father); the custodial parent has 
no income and the noncustodial parent has a net income of $1,000; and 
the noncustodial parent has three additional children of his own living 
with him. The following methods have been used to determine the 
proper deduction for hardship depending on the county where the matter 
is heard. The result of using the varying methods is lack of uniformity, 
and, in some cases inadequate and inequitable child support awards. 
The outcome achieved under option 4 is that sought by the proposed 
legislation. 
Discussion of Options 
1. No Deduction: If no "hardship" were found, the noncustodial 
parent would pay 27% of his net income to support his two 
children outside of the home. His child support obligation would 
be $297.00 or $148.50 per child pursuant to the Agnos mandatory 
minimum. 
2. Single Pot Theory: This option presumes the obligated parent 
should pay the same amount for each child based upon the total 
number of children and the requisite percentage of his income used 
for that number of children under Civil Code section 4722(b)(1). 
In this case the noncustodial parent has five children and 44% of 
his income would be spent on them; 44% of $1,100 is $484 
divided by five, or $96.80 per child. Since two children are the 
subject of the order to be made, the noncustodial parent would pay 
two times $96.80 or $193.60 as a child support order. Working 
backwards, however, under the Agnos Child Support Standards 
Act, if the noncustodial parent paid $193.60 for children in this 
example, he would effectively have been allowed a hardship 
deduction from income in the amount of $382.96 or $127.65 per 
child for the resident children. 
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3. Welfare Grant Deduction: In some jurisdictions "minimum basic 
living expenses" has been interpreted as an amount equal to a 
welfare grant for the number of children subject to the hardship 
deduction. Under this option, the noncustodial parent's income 
would be reduced by a grant for three children as follows: $1,100 
- $587 = $513. Then, the noncustodial parent would, under the 
Act, be required to spend 27% of the remainder on the children 
subject to the order (27% of $513 is $138.51 or $69.26 per child.) 
Yet $587, or $196.67 per child, would have been reserved for 
children residing in the home. 
4. Deduction May Not Exceed Minimum Award: This option 
would provide uniformity in applying the hardship allowances. In 
the example given above, the maximum deduction may be 
computed by a simple mathematical formula (see Appendix A). 
The result is a deduction of $105.69 per child in the home. The 
child support order is $105.69 for each child subject to the order. 
If under this option, the court found that a lesser deduction would 
be allowed for children in the home-presumably because a 
smaller hardship was found-then the child support order for 
children not residing in the home would be higher. In no event, 
however, would children in this home get a greater amount of the 
noncustodial parent's income reserved for them than would the 
children subject to the order. 
As may be readily seen, options 1, 2, and 3 allow children of the 
same parent to be provided with significantly different levels of support. 
Option 3, now being used in San Francisco, reserves almost three times 
as much for each child at home as is awarded to the children subject to 
the order under the Agnos Child Support Standards Act. On the other 
hand, option 4 equalizes the amount reserved for children of the same 
parent whether or not they live in the same home. The Task Force is 
proposing an amendment to section 4725(b) that would lend itself to the 
more equitable result. 
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Table I 
Options Child Support Allowable 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Award Based Deduction for 
on Net Income Hardship 
$297.00 
$193.60 
$138.51 
$211.39 
not specified 
$382.96 
$587.00 
$317.07 
*Children from first marriage 
**Children from second marriage 
Award for Each Income 
Child in Reserved for 
Support Order* Each Child in 
$148.50 
$ 98.80 
$ 69.26 
$105.69 
Home** 
not specified 
$127.65 
$195.67 
$105.69 
3. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND AWARENESS ABOUT 
CHILD SUPPORT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Accurate infonnation describing child and spousal support, custody 
and visitation rights, and the responsibilities, legal procedures, and 
processes of collection and payment of support must be made available 
to all parents involved in a support proceeding. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
Amend California Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475.1, 
which requires the State Department of Social Services to publish a 
booklet for parents regarding their support rights and responsibilities, to 
require the Judicial Council to review the booklet and to require that a 
copy of the booklet be served on all parties involved in a support 
proceeding. (Legislative Proposal #8) 
DISCUSSION 
It is apparent that parents continue to be confused about their child 
support, spousal support, and custody and visitation rights and 
obligations.43 Some parents do not take advantage of new laws that 
would benefit their children. Susan Speir, President of SPUNK,-
explains that custodial mothers do not make use of the simplified 
procedure to update child support orders, pursuant to California Civil 
Code section 4700.1, because of fear of a contested custody battle.44 
43. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CHILD SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT AND ENFORCEMENT, FINAL 
REPORT 17-18 (Jan. 1985). 
44. Letter from Susan Spier, SPUNK, to Michael E. Barber (Nov. 3, 1986). 
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One Task Force member, who counsels divorcing fathers, noted that 
when he explained California's new mandatory wage assignment law 
(Civil Code Section 4701), many parents asked "Where could they sign 
up?" These parents, when shown the benefits of the new law (e.g., not 
having to deal directly with the custodial parent. having payments made 
6n time, not liaving to subject new wives to the child support issue) 
were enthusiastic.45 
The Task Force believes that an informed parent will be a more 
responsible parent. Section 11475.5 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code requires the State Department of Social Services (SDSS) to 
prepare a booklet for parents describing the procedures and processes 
for the collection and payment of child and spousal support. Currently, 
the SDSS is required to distribute the booklet only to AFDC recipients 
and to District Attorneys' offices. The Task Force believes that this 
oooklet must receive the widest distribution possible. 
To guarantee that every parent involved in a support proceeding 
receives a copy of this oooklet, the Task Force recommends that section 
11475.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code be amended to require 
that: (1) the State Department of Social Services provide the booklets to 
all clerks of the Superior Court; (2) that the court clerks provide two 
copies of the booklet to all petitioners and plaintiffs in any child support 
action, and (3) that the petitioner or plaintiff be required to serve a copy 
of the booklet on the other parent or party involved in the case. In 
addition, the Task Force recommends that Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 11475.1 be amended to require that the Judicial Council review 
the oooklet for accuracy. 
The Task Force proposal will help guarantee that all parents 
involved in support actions have access to accurate information. As 
confusion, misinformation, and frustration are alleviated, parents will be 
encouraged to make proper use of all available remedies. 
4. PRO SE MODIFICATION - UPDATING SUPPORT 
ORDERS 
Child support orders need to be routinely updated to keep pace with 
inflation, to meet the increasing costs of raising growing children, and 
to guarantee uniformity of support orders. 
45. See also L. WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 304-05. 
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IMPLEMENT ATION 
Amend California Civil Code section 4700.1 to permit 
modifications up to applicable state or county guidelines, to provide 
equal access for updating support orders on behalf of AFDC recipients, 
and to c1artry apptlcation of the modification provisions. (Legislative 
Proposal #9) 
DISCUSSION 
While public attention has focused on the poverty of women and 
children caused by nonenforcement of support awards, nonenforcement 
is only part of the problem. For some families, initially low support 
awards are not adjusted throughout the child's life. Women and 
children may be forced into poverty because support awards do not keep 
pace with inflation or the escalating costs of meeting the needs of 
growing children. The effect of inflation on support awards erodes the 
purchasing power of the original dollar amount. Nor do stagnant 
awards reflect the paying parent's increase in wages, when those occur, 
which makes his or her support obligation a smaller, decreasing 
percentage of earnings. 
Professor Weitzman found that "less than 10 percent of the support 
awards included a cost of living escalator or other form of anti-
inflationary adjustment."46 Dr. Judith Wallerstein, in her ten-year 
follow-up study of largely white, middle-class divorced families from 
Marin County, found that child support awards "were generally not 
revised upward as the ... youngster entered adolescence"47 and that 
"most of the 30 percent of families who initiated litigation regarding 
money did so to request enforced payment of delinquent child support. 
Very few requested modification upward."48 
As pointed out by Dr. Wallerstein's study, failure to update support 
orders affects children psychologically, as well as economically: 
One attorney with a six-figure income paid $150 monthly for 
child support over the years, an amount that had been set when 
he was a young man recently graduated from law school and his 
only daughter was three years old. He continued his payments 
regularly throughout the entire ten years following the divorce. 
46. /d. at 28I. 
47. Wallerstein & Corbin, Father-Child Relationships After Divorce: Child Support and 
Educational Opportunity, FAM. L. Q., 109, 124 (1986). 
48. ld. at 116-17. 
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When the ninth year postdivorce approached, he voluntarily 
offered to increase his child support by $50, to a total of $200 
per month. His adolescent daughter sarcastically referred to this 
extra money as "a tip," telling us that her father withheld the 
additional $50 if she displeased him by being late for their 
visits.49 
In 1985, the California Legislature enacted the Agnos Child Support 
Standards Act50 for the purpose of providing for more adequate and 
equitable child support awards. However, the gains in adequacy and 
equity from using a support formula to establish initial support orders 
are undermined if the initial orders are not routinely updated. 
Without a simplified, automatic method for updating support orders, 
the burden is on the custodial parent to return to court on behalf of the 
child and petition for a modification of support based on "changed 
circumstances." This traditional modification process presents many 
difficulties for the custodial parent including lack of funds for legal 
expenses, time lost from work, emotional costs of returning to court, 
and possible retaliation by the noncustodial parent (e.g., withholding 
child support or requesting a change of custody).51 The custodial parent 
is left with no real choice: she or he either absorbs the impact of the 
deteriorating purchasing power of the initial award, or incurs the 
substantial legal expenses of seeking upward modification with the 
attendant risks of a contested custody battle or loss of custody. 
If support orders are not routinely updated, the goal of support 
guidelines to provide uniformity of support orders is destroyed. 
Similarly situated families will, once again, have different support 
orders simply because of the date of the initial order. Nationally, child 
support experts have developed two methods for routine updating of 
support awards to keep pace with inflation and the increased needs of 
growing children: (1) automatic escalation clauses (COLA's) based on 
fluctuations in the state or national Consumer Price Index;52 or (2) 
reapplication of mandatory support guidelines.53 Both methods seek to 
guarantee that the "buying power" of the amount originally determined 
as necessary to meet the child's needs will remain available. 
49. Id. at 117. 
50. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4720 (West 1980). 
51. Letter from Susan Speir, SPUNK, to Task Force Member Mike E. Barber (Nov. 3, 
1986). 
52. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 518.641. 
53. Williams, Child Support Guidelines: Economic Basis and Analysis of Alternative 
Approaches, I IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE 1,40 (1986). 
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Neither of these methods have been implemented in California. 
Instead, in 1984, California enacted Civil Code section 4700.1, which 
provides a simplified, semi-automatic procedure for increasing child 
support orders up to 10 percent a year. This method is somewhat 
similar to antomatie eost-of-living escalation clauses: section 4100.1 
presumes a need for increased support based on inflation and the higher 
costs of growing children. The custodial parent is therefore not required 
to prove "changed circumstances" in order to obtain an increase. 
Section 4700.1 also avoids the legal costs of updating awards by 
precluding attorney participation in these proceedings. Section 4700.1 
addresses the needs of the obligor-parent by inclusion of a simplified 
procedure for reducing support awards where the obligor-parent's 
economic situation deteriorates (e.g., loss of job). 
The Task Force found that the updating procedure pursuant to 
section 4700.1 is not being utilized by most parents. 54 The Task Force 
therefore recommends that Civil Code section 4700.1 be amended to 
facilitate and expand its use. 
As enacted, subdivision (d) of section 4700.1 does not make clear 
that the 10 percent modification provision applies only to increases, or 
upward modifications. It is therefore possible for a court to lower a 
support award by up to 10 percent without proof of changed 
circumstances. 55 Therefore, custodial parents are reluctant to utilize 
Section 4700.1 because they risk a reduced support order in the event of 
a challenge by the other parent. Thus, the Task Force is recommending 
that section 4700.1(d) be clarified to state that the 10 percent 
modification provision only applies to increases in support. 
Under the Task Force proposal, section 4700.1 would also be 
available to conform support awards to state or county child support 
guidelines where conformity to the guidelines would increase the award 
by an amount greater than 10%. In In re Marriage of Moore, the court 
held that 10 percent was a cap and, therefore, a support order could not 
be modified up to the applicable guideline in an action brought pursuant 
to section 4700.1. Permitting support orders to be brought into 
compliance with applicable guidelines through a simplified procedure, 
without proof of "changed circumstances" or use of attorneys, promotes 
the purpose of guidelines, to wit, equity and uniformity of support 
orders. Since the guidelines establish per se the state's determination of 
54. Susan Speir, Letter to Mike E. Barber, supra note 44; see also Mike E. Barber, Esq., 
(unpublished memorandum to Senate Task Force on Family Equity) (Aug. 5, 1986). 
55. This "10 percent provision" is based on a presumption that automatic increases in 
support awards are necessitated by inflation and the increased needs of growing children. 
There is no basis for presuming an automatic decreased support need. 
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the level of support necessary for raising children, all children should be 
entitled to that support level regardless of the date of the initial order. 
Finally, the Task Force believes that AFDC recipients (who have 
assigned their support rights to the state) are entitled to equal treatment 
with respect to updating support orders. The best interests of the child 
and the state are promoted by routine updating of these support orders. 
Updating of AFDC recipients' support orders would increase 
reimbursement to the state, and would make it more feasible for 
custodial parents and children to go off AFDC. Currently, attorneys are 
not allowed to participate in section 4700.1 proceedings. The AFDC 
recipient has assigned the rights to child support over to the state and 
therefore cannot represent himself/herself in a section 4700.1 
proceeding. Thus, the Task Force is recommending clarification that 
non attorney personnel of district attorney support enforcement units are 
permitted to utilize section 4700.1 to update support orders.56 
5. ESTABLISHMENT OF PATERNITY 
Meeting the increased volume of paternity cases requires special 
funding for county district attorney support enforcement units. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
Amend section 15200 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to 
require the State to reimburse counties for certain costs of establishing 
the paternity of children born out of wedlock. Specifically, the Task 
Force proposal would limit the county share of these costs to 5 percent 
and require that the state make up the difference between the federal 
share and 95 percent of the total cost. (Legislative Proposal #10). 
DISCUSSION 
A recommendation pertaining to the funding of district attorney 
efforts to establish paternity was made by the Governor's Commission 
on Child Support Development and Enforcement. 57 The Task Force 
endorses this recommendation (which has not yet been implemented) in 
order to provide greater incentive to counties to pursue the establishment 
56. Use of non attorney personnel is consistent with the representation of corporations 
or other entities in proceedings that exclude attorneys, such as small claims court. 
57. CAliFORNIA COMMISSION ON CHILD SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT Al'm ENFORCEMENT, FINAL 
REPORT 69 (1985). 
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of paternity, thereby increasing child support collections. The 
Commission's findings are summarized below:58 
1. Between 1970 and 1981, the number of babies born in California 
outside of marriage rose from 45,593 (or 12.6% of all live births) to 
91,526 (or 21.8% of all live births). Where paternity is not established 
for children born out of wedlock, the burden of providing for children 
falls entirely upon the mother or the State and the taxpayer. 
2. If an individual is ordered to pay child support it does not 
guarantee he or she will pay. But, if the person is never ordered to pay, 
there is not even the possibility for payment. Many out-of-wedlock 
fathers will and do admit paternity. However, their willingness to do so 
decreases significantly after the birth of the child. The father often loses 
contact with the mother and has no opportunity to develop a family 
relationship. Also, lulled into a false sense of security, the father may 
develop a family or at least another relationship which makes the 
ultimate payment of child support to the first child that much more 
difficult. Thus, it is in the best interests of both the father and the child 
to encourage the establishment of paternity in order to provide a basis 
for future visitation andlor custody rights as well as to secure financial 
59 support ... 
3. The Governor's Commission also emphasized that in addition to 
child support, other sources of income for the child depended upon a 
determination of paternity. These sources include social security, 
disability payments, and other types of "derivative rights.'ofi) Currently, 
the focus of county enforcement agencies is on cases which will most 
quickly result necessarily in a collection which will provide income to 
the child as well as incentive grants to the county.61 In comparison, "the 
establishment of paternity . . . is a costly and time-consuming 
process. "62 Therefore, county enforcement efforts cannot be expected 
to pick up a large portion of the cost of paternity establishment. 
Because the federal government currently reimburses the counties for 
approximately 70 percent of their child support administrative costs, 
raising the reimbursement rate to 95 percent for costs associated with the 
58. [d. at 69-75. 
59. [d. at 69. 
60. [d. at 70. 
61. /d. at 74. 
62. [d. 
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establishment of paternity would result in a shift of 25% of the cost to 
the state.63 
4. Although, as discussed by the Governor's Commission, there 
will not be immediate fiscal results from this proposal, "[i}t is a long-
term investment by the State in both the economic and social well-being 
of the child."64 The state could "expect to see a significant savings 
within four or five years."65 
6. SECURITY DEPOSITS FOR SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT 
An effective and mandatory enforcement mechanism is necessary to 
guarantee that obligor-parents who are self-employed, or otherwise not 
subject to a wage assignment, meet their child support obligations. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
Amend California Civil Code section 4701.1 to require mandatory 
security deposits where obligor-parents not subject to wage assignments 
are one month in arrears in payment of their child support obligations. 
(Legislative Proposal #11) 
DISCUSSION 
Noncompliance with child and spousal support orders has prompted 
passage of federal and state legislation requiring improved enforcement 
and collection mechanisms. However, this remedial legislation is, by 
and large, directed at collecting support from wage-earning obligor-
parents. 66 
Enforcement of child support orders in cases where obligor-parents 
are self-employed, or otherwise not subject to a wage assignment, 
continues to be a serious problem in California. Civil Code section 
4700 expressly authorizes a court to require a parent to give reasonable 
63. [d. at 75. 
64. [d. 
65. [d. 
66. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 V.S.c. §§ 666(a)(8), (b)(1) 
(1986) (mandating wage withholding); CAL. avo CODE § 4701(a) (mandatory wage 
assignments) . 
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security in meeting a support obligation; however, "[t]he reluctance 
courts show in imposing such a remedy is ... substantial.,,67 
In 1986, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1751, 
amending Civil Code section 4701 to require that mandatory wage 
assignments be imp()sed in all child suppon orders entered afteI' January 
1, 1987. While obligor-parents earning a salary are now subject to 
more stringent enforcement requirements, there is no similar treatment 
of obligor-parents who are self-employed or otherwise not subject to a 
wage assignment. The Task Force is therefore recommending 
legislation that would require a mandatory enforcement mechanism in 
cases where obligor-parents are not subject to a wage assignment 
pursuant to Section 4701. 
The Task Force proposal would require courts to order money or 
other assets valued at up to two (2) years worth of child support 
payments placed into a security deposit if the obligor-parent is one 
month in arrears in his child support payments. If the obligor-parent 
continues in arrears, the cash or assets in the security deposit would be 
used to meet the support obligation. If the obligor-parent makes all 
support payments in a timely manner for two years, the money or assets 
in the security deposit would be released and returned to the obligor-
parent. The Task Force proposal allows the district attorney to pay 
"reasonable fees" to the trustee of the security deposit fund. One Task 
Force member (Marvin Chapman) suggested that such "reasonable 
trustee fees" should not exceed the interest earnings on those funds, but 
no motion was made on this issue. 
The Task Force's proposed legislation provides a proper balance 
between the due process rights of the obligor-parent and the child's right 
to receive support in a timely manner. The proposed legislation includes 
clear and detailed provisions regarding the obligor-parent's rights to 
notice and accountings. Other provisions provide for payment of 
reasonable fees to the trustee for the sale and/or disbursal of assets in the 
security deposit, and exceptions for exempt assets of the obligor-
parents. 
The Task Force proposal is not extraordinary. At least twenty-nine 
states have laws authorizing courts, in their discretion, to require 
security or bonds to secure child support payments.68 The federal 1984 
Child Support Amendments also require states to "enact procedures 
67. Barber, Enforcement of Orders, HANDUNG SPOUSAL & CHILD SUPPORT AFTER AGNOS, 
DRTRA, AND THE 1986 TAX REFORM 197 (1986). 
68. KASTNER & YOUNG, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO STATE ClllLD 
SUPPORT AND PATERNITY LAWS, 124-26 (1982). 
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which require that an absent parent give security, post a bond, or give 
some other guarantee to secure payment of overdue support."69 The 
Task Force proposal is unique in that it makes the security deposit 
enforcement mechanism mandatory where the obligor-parent is in 
arr~~ @ti clearb':-sets--oot~prt!Cedure tore followed when this 
enforcement method is employed. The Task Force proposal constitutes 
the first attempt in the country to address the need for mandatory 
enforcement mechanisms in cases involving self-employed parents. 
7. JOINT CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
An award of joint custody should not reduce or lower child support 
awards pursuant to state or county support guidelines. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
Amend California Civil Code section 4727 to prohibit reduction of a 
child support obligation based upon an award of joint physical custody 
or "shared physical custody." The Task Force recommends that 
California Civil Code section 4727 be amended to require that 
(Legislative Proposal #12): 
(1) An award of joint custody shall not diminish the responsibility 
of each parent to provide for the support of the child in 
accordance with the Agnos Child Support Standards Act; and 
(2) Where joint physical custody is awarded, the child support 
formula established pursuant to the Agnos Child Support 
Standards Act or county guidelines shall be applied without 
consideration or reduction for the amount of time the child is to 
spend with the obligor-parent; and 
(3) That the Judicial Council and local counties shall adjust their 
child support guidelines to preclude reduction based upon the 
amount of time a child is to spend with the obligor-parent or the 
type of custody arrangement ordered. 
FINDINGS 
Current child support law provides an incentive to bargain over 
custody of the child by directly linking the amount of child support to 
69. 42 u.s.c. § 666(a)(4) (1986). 
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the type of custody arrangement. California Civil Code section 4727 
pennits the court to reduce the mandatory minimum child support award 
where the obligor-parent is awarded 30 percent or more custodial or 
visitation time with the child. The Judicial Council's discretionary 
guideline expressly includes the amount of time the child spends with 
each parent as a factor in the support formula.7o These laws treat the 
parents' homes as "hotels," allotting support based on the number of 
nights the child sleeps in each. 
The Task Force was concerned about the negative economic 
consequences of section 4727 on women and children, and the use of 
joint custody for the purpose of lowering child support obligations.71 
Section 4727 may also adversely affect the state's ability to obtain 
reimbursement for AFDC expenditures from an obligor-parent. 
Currently, section 4727 expressly excludes reduction of support in a 
joint custody arrangement "when a child or children are receiving an 
AFDC grant." However, the constitutionality of this provision is now 
being challenged on equal protection grounds in State of Washington 
Dept. of Social and Health Services v. Cobb. Should this challenge 
70. Cal. Rules of Court, Division VI, §§ 2(a), 5. 
71. Attorneys, mediators, and judges have noted the use of joint custody, or threats to 
contest custody, as a bargaining weapon to lower support obligations or obtain other 
fmancial concessions. See Public Hearing Record, Joint Hearing of the Senate JUdiciary 
Committee and the Senate Task Force on Family Equity (Oct. 16, 1986) (Testimony of 
Hugh McIssac, Director of Family Court Services, Los Angeles Superior Court, regarding 
joint custody requests to lower child support); L. WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 310-18 
(regarding one-third of mothers reporting that their husbands had used the threat of a 
custody contest as "a ploy in negotiations"); Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: 
Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POLY REV. 168 (1984); Foster & 
Freed, Law and the Family: Politics of the Divorce Process--Bargaining Leverage, Unfair 
Edge, 196 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 6 (1984); Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for 
Child Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 567 (1985) (footnotes 
omitted), noting that: 
[a] parent who is not really interested in having joint custody may use the threat 
of demanding it as a tool to induce the other parent to make concessions on 
issues of property division and child support. If there were good reasons to 
believe that imposed joint custody would work well for children, this impact on 
the negotiating process would be worth the risk. Because there are not, the risk 
is worth avoiding. 
See also MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON TIIE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF 
CmLDREN, Report of the Subcommittee on Divorce and Custody, (1986), finding that 
whenever the Uoint custody] statute is erroneously treated as a presumption, 
joint custody gives a bargaining advantage to a parent who may not otherwise 
be a candidate for custody. Often, the more appropriate parent, aware of the 
deficiencies of the other adult, will bargain away needed financial assets or 
income in order to get an agreement for sole custody. Conversely, some parents 
further manipulate the system by seeking joint custody in the hopes of paying 
less child support. 
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succeed and section 4727' s AFDC exception be held unconstitutional, 
obligor-parents will be able to limit or lower their AFDC reimbursement 
liability to the state by obtaining joint custody orders. 
Custodial mothers and children typically have a lower standard of 
living than obligor-parents. Allowing support awards to be decreased 
solely because of custody or visitation arrangements can lead to further 
disparities in standards of living between the parents' households. 
This, in turn, undermines the premise of support guidelines in the first 
place; to wit, improving the adequacy and equity of child support 
awards. 
Moreover, when custody and support are tied to the amount of 
support awarded, the focus may shift from what is best for the child to 
what is least expensive for the obligor-parent. Civil Code section 4727, 
by allowing for decreased support with increased visitation or joint 
custody, provides financial incentives for the obligor-parent to seek joint 
custody in order to lower his support obligation. Similarly, this statute 
creates disincentives for the lower-income parent (usually the mother) to 
agree to increased visitation or joint custody. Instead of focusing on 
what would be the best custody arrangement for the child emotionally, 
the lower income parent may be forced to base the custody decision on 
what will be best for the child economically - e.g., sole custody 
because it will increase the support award. 
One study has revealed a clear relationship between joint custody 
awards and the absence of, or reduction in, child support awards: 
Virtually all (93 percent) women with sole custody were also 
awarded child support. Among those whose custody 
agreements call for joint legal custody but maternal residential 
custody, the incidence of a child support award was nearly as 
high (86 percent) ... In instances of joint residential custody, 
however, the percentage receiving support stands at only 38 
percent with another 9 percent of cases calling for support a 
portion of the year. 72 
The researchers noted that in those joint residential custody cases 
where no support was ordered, the annual earnings of the two parents 
were equal at the time of separation.?3 However, the children actually 
were not living equal time in the two households. Instead, the children 
72. Pearson & Theonnes, Child Custody, Child Support Arrangements and Child 
Support Payment Patterns, 36 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 49, 51-52 (1985). 
73. Id. at 52. 
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were living with one parent more than two thirds of the time, yet that 
parent was receiving no support at all.74 
On the issue of amount of support, the study revealed even more 
reason for concern: 
In cases of joint residential custody when there was a-suppOll 
order, the amount of visitation averaged only 23 weekdays and 
58 overnights. Although this amount of contact with the other 
parent would not be an unusual amount of visitation in a sole 
custody/visitation agreement, the support payment for those with 
joint residential custody who were ordered to pay any support 
averaged 14 percent of net income, while the fathers whose 
wives had sole custody were ordered to pay an average of 26 
percent of their net income. This finding confirms the fears of 
those who believe that joint custody is being used to 
inappropriately reduce support awards.75 
Joint Custody More Expensive 
Section 4727 ignores the fact that joint custody is more expensive 
than sole custody. Economists have found that joint physical custody is 
a more expensive arrangement than sole custody.76 Both parents bear 
increased expenditures as they strive to maintain two complete 
households and arrange transportation between them. The effect of 
decreasing support in joint custody arrangements can be to increase the 
disparities in the two households' standard of living. 
Furthermore, allowing a reduction of support to the lower-income 
parent does not take into account the fact that the "base award" (i.e., the 
mandatory minimum child support award or applicable county 
guidelines) is based on a "sole custody" household and does not account 
for the increased overall expenses of raising a child in two 
households.77 Thus, the effect of section 4727 is to decrease an award 
that is already on its face insufficient for a joint custody arrangement. 
Section 4727 may imply that the obligor-parent, by spending 30 
percent or more time with the child, is taking on a greater share of direct 
costs of raising the child, and that this reduces the other parent's 
74. [d. See also POLIKOFF, Custody and Visitation: Their Relationship to Establishing 
and Enforcing Support, II IMPROVING CIllLD SUPPORT PRACTICE ill-131-32. 
75. POUKOFF, supra note 74, at III-132. 
76. See Patterson, The Added Cost of Sharing Lives: Don't Let The Extra Expense of 
Joint Custody Come As a Surprise To Your Client, 4 FAMILY ADVOCATE 10 (1982). 
77. Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique of Current 
Practice, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 55-56 (1982). 
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childrearing costS.?8 However, there is no economic evidence that a 
parent who has the child 30 percent of the time instead of 20 percent (or 
29 percent) bears such increased costs to the extent that his support 
obligation should be decreased: 
For example, visITation 01 30%, Wnlcn means 109 overnigIits, 
includes 36 more overnights than visitation of 20%, which 
includes 73 overnights. A parent who did not rent a larger 
apartment when he had the child for 73 overnights during the 
year is unlikely to rent a larger apartment solely because he has 
the child 36 more overnights. Similarly, the 36 extra overnights 
do not necessarily lead to increased costs in such items as 
clothing, medical insurance and care, transportation, etc .. 
The only sure increased cost will be for food- which is 
only 18.8 to 22.5% of the total expenditures on a child in a 
given year. Therefore, the noncustodial parent who has 5 
additional weeks of visitation during which time he pays for the 
child's food costs is assuming an additional 20% 
(approximately) of the expenditures associated with raising that 
child for that 5 weeks - or 2% of the total expenditures on the 
child over the course of the year. Yet under the proportional 
decrease scheme ... the noncustodial parent's proportional share 
of the child support may be reduced by a percentage much larger 
than 2% merely because the visitation was increased by 10%.19 
The direct costs to the parent who has been awarded child support, 
based on need, do not decrease because the child is sleeping 
elsewhere.8o He or she will have to continue paying rent and utilities on 
the same home even during those periods when the child is not there. 
Similarly, health insurance, auto loans, medical and dental payments, 
and costs of clothing and household goods continue regardless of where 
the child is sleeping on a given night. 
Decreased Support Detrimental 
78. Section 4727 may imply that the obligor-parent, by spending more time with the 
child, is entitled to credit for his nonmonetary childrearing efforts. However, if this is the 
underlying theory of Section 4727, it discriminates against the parent receiving support 
(usually the mother). Under the Judicial Council support guidelines and Section 4722, the 
custodial parent's income is included as a component in the formula. Credit is not 
explicitly given for that parent's nonmonetary childrearing contributions. 
79. K. GETMAN, A CRITIQUE OF THE EFFECf OF NON-TRADITIONAL VISITATION AND 
CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS ON CmLD SUPPORT AWARDS UNDER CURRENT GUIDELINES AND 
FORMULAS 4-5 (1986). 
80. Bruch, supra note 77. 
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Decreased support in joint custody arrangements is likely to be 
detrimental to children's emotional well-being. Studies show that 
children of divorce are adversely affected by seeing their parents in two 
households with disparate standards of living. The children feel anger 
and deprivation. and the economic disparities serve to exacerbate 
fufrafaImly tensions arising from the divorce. In joint pbysicaI custooy 
arrangements where the child is moving between two households of 
disparate standards of living frequently, the child's anger and 
resentment increases: 
Where the former husband continued to live fairly well 
economically and the mother and children faced poverty or a 
significantly lower standard of living, the mother and children 
were likely to be angry and depressed for many years and to 
remain preoccupied with this discrepancy in living standard.8l 
Joint custody should imply equal sharing of resources, as well as 
children, on a continuing basis. In fact, the Task Force received public 
testimony that the most appropriate child support standard in joint 
physical custody arrangements is "equalizing" the standard of living 
between the two households.82 
Section 4727 discourages a focus on the best interest of the child 
and can serve to further decrease the standard of living of the mother 
and child. The problems faced by the child who must accommodate two 
separate households of disparate standards of living are further 
exacerbated. The Task Force proposal would eliminate any reduction or 
adjustment of child support awards when joint physical custody is 
awarded. It would require strict application of the state or county 
support guidelines without regard to the amount of time the child spends 
with the obligor-parent. 
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
8. ELIMINATE DEFENSES FOR FAILURE TO OBEY A 
COURT ORDER 
Eliminate the defenses of waiver and estoppel in enforcement of 
child support. 
81. J. WALLERSTEIN & HUNTINGTON, Bread and Roses: Nonfinancial Issues Related to 
Fathers' Economic Support of Their Children Following Divorce, in THE PARENTAL-
CIllLD-SUPPORT OBUGATION, 149-150 (1983). 
82. See Public Hearing Record, supra note 71 (Testimony of Hugh McIsaac, Director of 
Family Court Services, Los Angeles County Superior Court). 
- .. ' ~~ 
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IMPLEMENT ATION 
Legislation should be enacted to eliminate the defenses of waiver 
and estoppel in enforcement of support, and to expressly state that 
collection of support at less than the fuTI amount due does not waive or 
estop later collection of the remaining sum due. 
DISCUSSION 
In 1985, the Governor's Commission on Child Support and 
Development and Enforcement recommended elimination of the 
defenses of waiver and estoppel. 83 The Task Force endorses the 
Commission's recommendation. California law states that support 
orders are "irrevocable as to accrued installments.,,84 However, there is 
a tendency of some courts to not require actual payment by the obligor 
parent of past due support based on (l) a showing of some form of an 
implied waiver by the parties, or (2) estoppel because of a party's failure 
to enforce sooner. 85 
Waiver and estoppel defenses reward non-paying parents and 
penalize custodial parents and children. For example, an obligor-parent 
is encouraged to disappear and not pay support in order to later raise the 
defense of estoppel. The custodial parent, who is not receiving support 
and, therefore, may be unable to afford the costs of locating the obligor 
in order to enforce the support order, is penalized for supporting the 
children herself. In addition, battered women often do not pursue 
support enforcement for several years because they are afraid of 
jeopardizing their safety and that of their children.86 Estoppel doctrines 
potentially reward a parent who can intimidate the other parent into 
delaying enforcement of support orders. The use of waiver or estoppel 
as defenses discourages enforcement of support orders and could also 
affect interstate enforceability of California support orders. (One Task 
Force member, Marvin Chapman, dissented from the majority opinion 
on this proposal.) 
83. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CHILD SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT At-.n ENFORCEMENT, supra 
note 57, at 18-19. 
84. Id. at 18. 
85.Id. 
86. See, e.g., Friedman v. Exel, 116 A.D.2d 433,501 N.Y.S.2d 831 (New York court 
holds that battered mother's failure to enforce child support order for 12 years may 
constitute waiver). 
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9. RE·EXAMINATION/UPDATE OF CHILD SUPPORT 
GUIDELINES 
California's child support guidelines, which are intended to reflect 
the costs of raising children, need to be reevaluated in light of new 
economic data. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The Legislature should establish a commission or task force, which 
includes economists and researchers, to examine the costs of raising 
children in California based on new economic data. 
DISCUSSION 
California's child support guidelines were based, in part, on the 
costs of raising children as developed by economist Thomas 
Espenshade.87 However, Espenshade's economic data have come 
under criticism in the last year for seriously undervaluing the costs of 
raising children.88 In fact, the federal Office of Child Support 
Enforcement is preparing to distribute materials that detail some flaws 
and miscalculations upon which guidelines were based.89 Some of the 
weaknesses in Espenshade's data and calculations include: 
• His data was based on the percentage of parental income spent on 
children in two-parent intact families.9o Thus, his calculations did 
not consider the higher costs of raising children in single-parent 
households. Total family expenses after separation are higher than 
those for a two-parent family living in one household.91 In other 
words, the percentage of family income that goes towards raising 
children is higher in a two-household, separated family than in a 
87. Norton, Mandatory Support Schedules -- Is Your State Ready?, 12 FAM. L. REp. 
3016 (1986). 
88. See S. GOLDFARB, Cmw SUPPORT GUIDEl1NES: How You CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 4, 
7-9 (1987); L. WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 270-72; Polikoff, Looking for the Policy 
Choices Within An Economic Methodology: A Critique of the Income Shares Model 
(Women's Legal Defense Fund, 1986) (paper presented at the National Conference on the 
Development of Child Support Guidelines, September 1986). 
89. EsSENTIALS OF Cmw SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS (1987) (proceedings of the National Conference on the 
Development of Child Support Guidelines, September 1986, available from the federal 
Office of Child Support Enforcement, 330 C Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20201). 
90. Williams, supra note 53, at 1-6 to 1-7; S. GOLDFARB, supra note 88, at 8. 
91. S. GOLDFARB, upra note 88, at 8; Bruch, supra note 77. 
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two-parent, one-household family.92 However, California's 
guidelines are based on the lower, "two-parent one-household" 
percentage. 
• Espenshade's percentages of expenditures on children were based 
on the government Consumer Expenditure Survey for 1972-1973, 
updated to 1981 price levels.93 The 1982-83 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey is now available and provides more recent, 
accurate data on expenditures on children. 
• Espenshade's calculations were based on a "marginal cost 
approach theory".94 That is, Espenshade determined the extent to 
which the expenses of two adults with a certain number of 
children exceeded the expenses of two adults with no children. 
This "marginal cost approach" places a lower estimate on expenses 
for children than would be the case if the family's expenses were 
divided equally among the total number of family members.95 In 
addition, the "marginal cost approach" assumes that when two 
adults have children, the adults continue to spend the same on 
themselves as when they had no children, and that the cost of 
raising children is merely the additional expenses they incur after 
meeting their original "two adult" expenses without children. 
These are only some of the criticisms of Espenshade's research and 
calculations.96 Thus, California's guidelines should be reevaluated in 
light of this new research and data. 
10. MONITOR SUPPORT GUIDELINES 
Child support awards made pursuant to The Agnos Child Support 
Standards Act of 1984 need to be monitored. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
The Judicial Council should institute, as soon as possible, a 
monitoring system to determine how counties are implementing the 
92. Bruch, supra note 77, at 59-60. 
93. Williams, supra note 53; S. GOLDFARB, supra note 88, at 8. 
94./d. at 1-6; S. GOLDFARB, supra note 88, at 8-9. 
95./d. 
96. See, e.g., S. GOLDFARB, supra note 88, at 7-9; ESSENTIALS OF CHILD SUPPORT 
GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT, supra note 89. 
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Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984, and whether this law is 
resulting in adequate child support awards. 
FINDINGS 
Some important goals of the Agnos Act (Ch. 1605/1984) were to 
enhance uniformity in awards and to increase the amount of child 
support awarded. A number of persons, especially district attorneys 
representing AFDC recipients, have given anecdotal evidence of 
improvement in the level of awards under the Agnos Act. However, 
some attorneys and custodial parents claim that the Agnos Act is being 
misinterpreted by courts. 
The Task Force received complaints from attorneys and parents that 
some courts are interpreting the "mandatory minimum child support 
award" pursuant to Sections 4722(a) and 4723 [AFDC grant level] as a 
cap or "ceiling" on child support awards.97 Also, it was indicated that 
judges have refused to apply the discretionary guidelines developed by 
the Judicial Council or counties. 
The Task Force did not have the resources or time to determine the 
prevalence of misinterpretation and misapplication of the Agnos Act. 
However, if the Act is being interpreted as a "ceiling," rather than a 
"floor," for child support awards, the result will be institutionalization 
of child support awards at the poverty level. Therefore, the Task Force 
recommends that the Judicial Council regularly collect data and monitor 
the adequacy of child support awards. 
11. SUPPORT AND VISITATION 
The duty of support should not be affected by the rights of custody 
or visitation. Child support and parental rights of custody and visitation 
must remain separate issues. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
Oppose legislation that would permit issues of visitation or custody 
to be joined to, coordinated with, or raised in a cross-complaint in a 
child support action. 
97. See, e.g., Public Hearing Record, Joint Hearing of Senate Judiciary Committee and 
the Senate Task Force on Family Equity (Oct. 16, 1986) (Written testimony of A. Bailey 
and M. Baker-Davidson); Letter of George H. Norton, Esq., to Senate JUdiciary Committee 
(Oct. 7, 1986). 
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DISCUSSION 
Permitting custody or visitation issues to be raised in a support 
proceeding undermines national and state public policy to encourage 
strict enfor£ement of child support.98 Cross-complaints for custody or 
visitation denial have been used to successfully intimidate or discourage 
custodial parents from pursuing modifications or enforcement of 
support orders. California Civil Code section 4382 recognizes that child 
custody and parental rights of visitation and custody are clearly separate 
issues. The Task Force, therefore, recommends that no legislation be 
enacted that would undermine section 4382 or link custody/visitation 
and support issues. 
12. STATEWIDE LIEN SYSTEM 
Establish a central state agency for the recording of child support 
judgments as liens against obligor-parents' real property owned 
throughout the state, and require that all child support judgments be 
automatically filed with this agency. 
IMPLEMENT ATION 
In order to enhance the ability of parents and district attorneys to 
enforce child support, a more expeditious system must be instituted to 
allow liens to be established across county lines. In the FY 1987-88 
state budget the Governor has proposed to establish a computerized, 
statewide lien program. Also, Assemblyman Tom Bates has introduced 
legislation (AB 2025) to implement such a system. 
DISCUSSION 
This recommendation was adopted by the Governor's Commission 
on Child Support Development and Enforcement.99 The Task Force 
endorses the Commission's Recommendation and findings. 
A statewide central recording and lien system would create an 
efficient and effective technique for enforcing child support obligations. 
Currently, a judgment must be separately filed in each county where the 
obligor owns real property. Thus, to assure that all of an obligor-
parent's property is subject to a lien, the child support order would have 
98. See KASTNER & YOUNG, supra note 68, at 52-54. 
99. CAUFORNIA COMMISSION ON CHILD SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT AND ENFORCEMENT, supra 
note 57, at 47-54. 
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to be recorded in 58 counties. By establishing a central state agency, a 
judgment would only have to be filed in one place to establish a lien on 
all of the real property owned by the obligor throughout the state. 
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